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Summary 
Celebrating 60 years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides an 
opportune moment to ask whether it is time for the other great apes to be granted 
‗human rights‘. Nonhuman great apes are not human beings and therefore ‗human 
rights‘ is inappropriate terminology in this context. Nevertheless there is a strong 
argument for granting great apes fundamental legal rights such as bodily liberty 
(freedom from slavery) and bodily integrity (freedom from torture). For some readers 
this suggestion may seem odd or laughable. But John Stuart Mill astutely recognised 
that ―each time there is a movement to confer rights upon some new ‗entity,‘ the 
proposal is bound to sound odd or frightening or laughable. This is partly because 
until the rightless thing receives its rights, we cannot see it as anything but a thing for 
the use of ‗us‘—those who are holding rights at the time‖ (Mill J (1859)  p.126). 
Although Mill‘s words related to the controversial debate of his time – whether 
women were rational beings deserving of  a legal right to vote – the wisdom of his 
words ring true to the current controversial debate – whether great apes are rational 
and emotional beings deserving of a legal right to freedom from torture and slavery. 
This debate is not pure academic speculation. Questions as to the legal personhood of 
chimpanzees have recently arisen in international cases. 
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Can a chimpanzee be the subject of a Habeas Corpus writ? 
In 2005 a Brazilian court was asked to grant an order of Habeas Corpus in respect of a 
chimpanzee, Suica, living in Salvador‘s Zoo (9th Criminal Court, Habeas Corpus 
833085-3/2005 available at www.animallaw.info/nonus/cases/cabrsuicaeng2005.htm).  
In the eyes of the law a captive chimpanzee is a legal thing and not a legal person. 
Granting a Habeas Corpus writ in respect of a thing is a legal impossibility and it was 
expected that Judge Lucio da Cruz would dismiss the case. Unexpectedly he didn‘t. 
He felt that the case raised a highly complex issue deserving of an in-depth 
examination. Those acting for the zoo were unprepared for this outcome and 
requested a 72 hour postponement in order to prepare their case. This was granted and 
was followed by another request for a further 72 hours which was also granted. 
However, during this second extension Suica mysteriously died. The judge 
commented upon the fact that he had covertly visited the zoo the previous weekend 
and Suica appeared in good health. Whilst the chimpanzee‘s untimely death put an 
end to the case, the case itself bought into the lime light arguments that have been 
simmering beneath the surface for years. This case has fuelled the controversial 
debate as to whether fundamental legal rights such as freedom from torture and 
slavery should be extended to certain non-human animals, in particular, the great 
apes.  
 
Fundamental legal rights for chimpanzees 
Steven Wise advocates an extension of the fundamental legal rights of bodily integrity 
and bodily liberty to certain non-human animals, beginning with chimpanzees and 
bonobos (Wise S (2000)). Wise argues that mental abilities that constitute what he 
terms ‗practical autonomy‘ entitle any being (whatever species) to basic liberty rights 
(freedom from torture and slavery). According to Wise a being has practical 
autonomy if it can desire, intentionally try to fulfil those desires and possesses a sense 
of self-sufficiency to understand that it is he who wants something and is trying to get 
it. Wise relies upon current scientific knowledge about the minds of chimpanzees to 
illustrate that they are autonomous beings with sufficient practical autonomy to entitle 
them to basic liberty rights.  
 
Chimpanzees are self-conscious; use insight to solve problems; understand cause and 
effect; can imitate, teach and deceive and have even demonstrated empathy. They are 
capable of complex mental representations – holding two mental representations 
simultaneously to compare them. In one test the chimpanzees were shown a toy can of 
drink hidden in a scale model of a real room. When taken to the actual room the 
chimpanzees were able to go straight to where the can of drink was hiding. Most of 
the 3-year old humans who undertook this test were unable to do this (Kuhlmeier et 
al, (1999)). In 2007 researchers at Kyoto University discovered that young 
chimpanzees demonstrate an extraordinary working memory for numerical 
recollection. The chimpanzees preformed better than the adult university student 
volunteers who participated in the tasks. In some cases the chimpanzee‘s success rate 
was double that of the students (Matsuzawa T (2007)).  
 
In addition to cognitive ability, there is evidence that chimpanzees experience 
emotions. There are abundant examples of chimpanzees experiencing joy, fear, 
frustration, anxiety and grief. The primatologist, Dr Jane Goodall observed the sad 
decline of an 8-year old male chimpanzee, Flint, who lived in the wild and was 
abnormally dependent on his mother, Flo. When Flo died naturally from old age, Flint 
fell into a state of despondency, refusing to eat and quickly became ill. Jane wrote,  
 
“The last time I saw him alive, he was hollow-eyed, gaunt and utterly 
depressed, huddled in the vegetation close to where Flo had died. The last 
short journey he made, pausing to rest every few feet, was to the very place 
where Flo’s body had lain. There he stayed for several hours, sometimes 
staring into the water. He struggled on a little further, then curled up – and 
never moved again” (Goodall J (2000)). 
 
 As an 8 year old male, Flint was physically capable of living many more years, but it 
seems that he grieved the loss of his mother and effectively gave up. 
 
There are examples of gorilla emotions that have received a very public airing. In 
August 2008 people throughout the world witnessed the grief of a gorilla living in 
Munster Zoo, Germany whose 3-month old baby had died. The mother, Gana, spent 
many hours gently stroking her dead baby as if to try to restore movement to the limp 
arms and lolling head. Many people who watched were moved to tears. In 1996 a 
gorilla, Binti Jua, at a zoo in Illinois demonstrated compassion and altruism for 
another species. A 3-year old human child accidentally fell 24 feet to the cement floor 
of the gorilla enclosure. Binti, who was herself a mother and was carrying her own 
infant on her back, lifted the unconscious child and carefully carried him to the 
entrance where the zoo staff were waiting. Roger Fouts commented on Binti‘s 
actions: "Binti clearly demonstrates that, just as some humans are capable of 
compassion, caring, and altruistic acts, so too are some members of the gorilla 
species‖ (Fouts R (1997)). Altruism, especially when shown towards another species, 
is generally believed to be exclusive to humans. 
 
These are just a handful of examples to illustrate, in the limited space available, the 
complex intellectual and emotional lifes of great apes. But what can we deduce from 
this? Was the gorilla, Gana, really in a state of mental anguish at the loss of her baby 
or are we ‗anthropomorphising‘ her actions – imbuing her actions with human 
emotions? Even if we accept that great apes are intelligent, social and emotional 
beings how does this translate, if at all, to the granting of legal personhood? Now we 
move into the fascinating realms of what constitutes legal personhood with its 
consequent entitlement to rights. What are rights and is it even possible for a non-
human animal to possess rights?  
 
The legal wall 
At present there is a thick legal wall between humans and non-human animals. 
Humans enjoy the status of ‗legal persons‘ and all benefit from fundamental rights 
such as those incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On the 
other side of the legal wall are legal things, which, by definition, enjoy no legal rights. 
A million species of animal from an adult gorilla to a slug are lumped together behind 
that legal wall existing as ‗things‘. In 2000 the Kerala High Court, when deciding a 
case involving the welfare of circus animals, suggested that it was time to dismantle 
this wall,  
 
―If humans are entitled to fundamental rights, why not animals? In our 
considered opinion, legal rights shall not be the exclusive preserve of the 
humans which has to be extended beyond people thereby dismantling the thick 
legal wall with humans all on one side and all non-humans on the other side‖ 
(N. R. Nair v UOI, 6
th
 June 2000, Kerala High Court). 
 
What are the justifications for this legal wall? How can we justify treating an adult 
chimpanzee as a legal thing and consequently deny it the right to freedom from torture 
or slavery? Is it possible to identify a characteristic possessed by all humans and no 
animals to justify this significant differential treatment? Many academics, both 
lawyers and philosophers alike, have struggled with this question. But there are no 
clear answers. An adult chimpanzee is more rational than some severely mentally 
disabled human adults. Dolphins have demonstrated a greater understanding of 
language (including syntax, especially word order) than a one-day old human baby. 
The mentally disabled adult and the one day old baby benefit from fundamental legal 
rights that they do not understand and cannot assert or claim. As human beings they 
are, quite rightly in my opinion, entitled to that protection. But how do we justify 
denying this protection to the chimpanzee? We have to be able to justify drawing the 
line between us and the other great apes. If not, we are sanctioning arbitrarily drawn 
lines to permit differential treatment. Arbitrarily drawn lines should be avoided. We 
need to justify our actions in order to prevent discrimination. The term ‗speciesism‘ 
has been coined to describe the practice of discriminating on the grounds of species 
membership alone. 
 
Opponents to granting legal rights to animals rely on the link between rights and 
responsibilities. They argue that one cannot enjoy the benefit of rights without also 
accepting the corresponding burden of responsibility. The geneticist Professor Steve 
Jones argues that, ―Rights and responsibilities go together and I‘ve yet to see a chimp 
imprisoned for stealing a banana because they don‘t have a moral sense of what‘s 
right and wrong‖ (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/6505691.stm). However, 
many humans also lack the capacity for moral responsibility but nevertheless enjoy 
rights to freedom from torture and slavery. Very young children, senile adults and 
severely mentally disabled people may all be unable to appreciate the difference 
between right and wrong but nevertheless they benefit from the protection of legal 
rights. Moreover if their human rights are violated, representatives or guardians will 
act on their behalf to assert those rights. Their own inability to assert or claim their 
rights does not preclude them from having those rights in the first place. 
 
Personhood – philosophy and law 
Philosophers distinguish between ‗humans‘ and ‗persons‘. Humans are those that fall 
within the biological classification homo sapiens, whereas a person refers to those 
with certain traits or characteristics. John Locke defined a person as a "thinking 
intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the 
same thinking thing, in different times and places‖ ( (1690) chapter 9, p.29). The 
criteria for personhood includes self-awareness, self-control, a number of 
sophisticated cognitive capacities such as problem solving and analytical thought, a 
sense of past and future, the ability to relate to others, demonstrate concern for others 
and to communicate with others. Using these criteria philosophers grapple with the 
difficult question of whether every human is also a person. Is a human who is in a 
coma and being kept alive on a life support machine a person? From the legal 
perspective this is less problematic since all humans are entitled to be recognised as 
legal persons and consequently enjoy the benefit of the rights and protections that 
flow from that recognition (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 6, 
‗Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law‘). 
Therefore all humans are persons in the eyes of the law but there is, nevertheless, a 
distinction between humans and persons. The category of legal persons is not limited 
to humans. A legal fiction exists that allows companies to benefit from certain human 
rights, for example, a company may enjoy a right to the protection of its property 
under Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights as given 
effect to in English law by  the Human Rights Act 1998. It is important to appreciate 
that the rights and duties that a company has as a legal person differs from that of a 
human being. A company does not benefit from the right to education or freedom of 
religion under the Human Rights Act 1998. This illustrates that the concept of legal 
personhood is already flexible enough to bend according to the nature of the entity. 
Recognising a nonhuman such as a chimpanzee as a legal person and tailoring its 
legal rights in accordance to the nature of this being is not therefore without 
precedent. Just as a company benefits from the right to the protection of its property 
but doesn‘t need a right to education, a chimpanzee could enjoy freedom from torture 
and slavery without acquiring a right to freedom of expression or religion. 
 
The recent bicentenary of the 1807 act of parliament that abolished the Transatlanic 
Slave Trade was a timely reminder that the category of legal persons is not closed. 
Over the years, it has had to adapt to changing times to encapsulate new entities. 
Slavery in the former colonies of the British Empire existed because some humans 
were deemed to be property. They were classified as legal things and not persons. In 
1772 Lord Mansfield was asked to grant an order of habeas corpus in respect of an 
enslaved African, James Somerset. Somerset had run away from his master whilst in 
England but was later apprehended and forced onto a ship bound for Jamaica. Lord 
Mansfield granted the writ uttering the now famous words ―Let justice be done, 
though the Heavens may fall‖ (Somerset v Stewart (1772) 1 K.B). It was held that a 
slave owner had no right under English law to forcibly remove a slave from Britain. 
Whilst this case was significant in fuelling growing support for the abolition of 
slavery, it was not abolished in the British Colonies until 1834, sixty-two years after 
the Somerset case. After many years of arduous campaigning by an enlightened few, 
public perception changed and it was seen as morally abhorrent to treat humans as 
property. Eventually the law followed suit thereby reclassifying those who had 
previously been things into persons. 
 
Legal personhood is not the same as being human 
There appears to be a deep seated fear of equating animals with humans which is 
hindering progress. This fear was evident when Darwin published his theory of 
human evolution in 1871 (Darwin C (1871)). His theory, especially the idea that 
humans have descended from apes, met with fierce opposition. Even now there are 
some who do not accept that humans share a common ancestor with chimpanzees. But 
in the context of the extension of legal personhood to apes, this fear is based on a 
fundamental misunderstanding. Granting some non-human animals basic fundamental 
legal rights does not equate them with humans. A chimpanzee is not a human and 
does not need ‗human rights‘ but nevertheless there is a strong argument for granting 
him legal personhood so that he can enjoy the rights to freedom from torture and 
slavery. This fear of equating animals with humans was apparent in reasoning 
recently given in an Austrian court. In 2007 the court was asked to appoint a legal 
guardian for Hiasl, a chimpanzee living in an Austrian animal sanctuary 
(www.bioedonline.org/news/news.cfm?art=3289). For the court to appoint Hiasl a 
legal guardian, it would have to first recognise the chimpanzee as a legal person. The 
judge denied the request on the basis that to grant a chimpanzee a legal guardian 
might create a public perception that humans with court appointed legal guardians are 
at the same level as animals. This is an unfortunate decision which clearly rests on the 
fear of equating apes with humans. The case has gone on appeal and the decision is 
awaited with great interest. 
 
A Declaration of the Rights of Great Apes 
The Great Ape Project is an international organisation which aims to achieve legal 
personhood for non-human great apes (www.greatapeproject.org). The project has 
drawn up a declaration of rights in the following terms:  
 
―We demand the extension of the community of equals to include all great 
apes: human beings, chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas and orang-utans. The 
community of equals is the moral community within which we accept certain 
basic moral principles or rights as governing our relations with each other and 
enforceable at law. Among these principles or rights are the following:  
 
I. The Right to Life  
The lives of members of the community of equals are to be protected. 
Members of the community of equals may not be killed except in very strictly 
defined circumstances, for example, self-defence.  
 
II. The Protection of Individual Liberty 
Members of the community of equals are not to be arbitrarily deprived of their 
liberty; if they should be imprisoned without due legal process, they have the 
right to immediate release. The detention of those who have not been 
convicted of any crime, or of those who are not criminally liable, should be 
allowed only where it can be shown to be for their own good, or necessary to 
protect the public from a member of the community who would clearly be a 
danger to others if at liberty. In such cases, members of the community of 
equals must have the right to appeal, either directly or, if they lack the relevant 
capacity, through an advocate, to a judicial tribunal.  
 
III. The Prohibition of Torture  
The deliberate infliction of severe pain on a member of the community of 
equals, either wantonly or for an alleged benefit to others, is regarded as 
torture, and is wrong.‖  
 
(Cavalieri P and Singer P (eds) (1993)). 
 
The Great Ape Project campaigns for a United Nations Declaration of the rights of 
Great Apes. Its first step towards reaching this goal came in March 2007 when the 
Balearic Parliament announced its approval of the Great Ape Project declaration. 
Then in June 2008 the Spanish Parliament‘s environmental committee approved 
resolutions supporting the Great Ape Project‘s mission to attain legal rights for non-
human great apes. Dr Pedro Y. Ynterian, president of the Great Ape Project 
International, recognised the significance of this achievement, ―This is the first time in 
the history of Humanity that an important Parliament has announced its approval of 
rights for Great Primates‖ (www.greatapeproject.org/news.php). It is expected that 
the Spanish Government will pass legislation within a year in line with the 
committee‘s resolutions. If and when this happens it will constitute a ground-breaking 
event as it will be the first piece of legislation in the world granting non-human great 
apes fundamental legal rights, thereby treating them as legal persons and not legal 
things. 
 
Whilst Britain has not yet taken the bold step of recognising non-human great apes as 
legal persons, it has granted them a special status in relation to scientific procedures 
conducted on animals. Home Office Guidelines state that no licence will be granted 
by the Secretary of State for the use of great apes in animal experimentation in 
England and Wales  (http://scienceandresearch.homeoffice.gov.uk/animal-
research/animal-testing-faqs/) . The impetus for this prohibition came from the 
growing scientific evidence that great apes are intelligent and self-aware with 
complex emotional lives. Lord Williams of Mostyn said, "This is a matter of morality. 
The cognitive and behavioural characteristics and qualities of these animals means it 
is unethical to treat them as expendable for research‖ (quoted in‗UK Bans 
Experiments on Great Apes’ Bridging the GAP: Newsletter of the Great Ape Project 
International, Autumn/Winter 1997 as cited in Hall L and Water A ‗From Property to 
Person, the case of Evelyn Hart‘ A model brief for non-human personhood 
(http://www.personhood.org/personhood/lawreview/)). 
 
New Zealand has taken this one step further with the first legislative breakthrough for 
great apes. The Animal Welfare Act 1999 prohibits the use of all great apes in 
research, testing and teaching unless such use is in the best interests of the non-human 
hominid or its species. This legislation does not grant great apes any legal rights but it 
does give them special protection under the law.  
 
In 2002 Germany became the first country in Europe to include animal welfare in its 
constitution. The constitution was amended by adding the words ―and animals‖ to a 
clause that obliges the state to respect and protect the dignity of humans. Interestingly 
the change came about as a result of a case on the religious slaughter of farm animals. 
In 1995 a German court ruled that the Muslim slaughter of animals, which involves 
slitting the throat of the animal and letting it bleed to death without the use of any 
prior stunning, was illegal This decision was challenged in Germany‘s Constitutional 
court in 2002 and was overturned (Bundesverfassungdgericht 1 B v R 1783/99) It was 
held that the ban on religious slaughter amounted to an unacceptable interference with 
professional freedom as Muslims were effectively prevented from working as 
butchers. Professional freedom is protected by the German constitution but, at that 
time, animal welfare was not a constitutional consideration and therefore could not be 
weighed in the balance. The change in the constitution sought to rectify this. 
Consequently, including ‗animal welfare‘ in the German constitution had, and has, 
nothing to do with granting animals ‗rights‘. Animals are not legal persons in 
Germany. However, the welfare of animals is now a factor to be taken into account 
and weighed in the balance whenever the Constitutional court is deciding what action 
to take in a given case. For example, if a case were to come before the court 
concerning animal experimentation, the court may be required to balance the right to 
freedom of scientific inquiry against the responsibility to protect animal welfare. 
 
In the context of animal experimentation in Europe, there has been another recent 
breakthrough for the great apes. In 2008 the European Commission proposed a ban on 
the use of the great apes in scientific procedures throughout Europe  (COM (2008) 
543/5) . Once again it stops short of granting them any rights as a legal person but 
instead seeks to grant them a special status in recognition of their advanced cognitive 
abilities and complex social and emotional lives. The significance of this proposal lies 
not in its practical implementation (since great apes are no longer used in experiments 
in Europe) but in its promotion of the great apes as deserving of a special legal status 
– could this be one small step away from granting them legal personhood per se? 
 
Conclusion 
This article has sought to advocate the case for extending some of the fundamental 
legal rights, which are currently the exclusive preserve of humans, to nonhuman great 
apes. It is a bold case to make but one which is increasingly moving into the public 
domain as Parliaments and courts around the world are tackling issues as to the legal 
status of great apes. I believe that it is only a matter of time before we recognise great 
apes as rational and emotional beings deserving of a legal right to freedom from 
torture and slavery. 
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